Award Abstract # 2333980
Collaborative Research: CPS: Medium: Sensor Attack Detection and Recovery in Cyber-Physical Systems

NSF Org: CNS
Division Of Computer and Network Systems
Recipient: UNIVERSITY OF NOTRE DAME DU LAC
Initial Amendment Date: July 14, 2023
Latest Amendment Date: July 14, 2023
Award Number: 2333980
Award Instrument: Standard Grant
Program Manager: Phillip Regalia
pregalia@nsf.gov
 (703)292-2981
CNS
 Division Of Computer and Network Systems
CSE
 Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering
Start Date: October 1, 2023
End Date: June 30, 2026 (Estimated)
Total Intended Award Amount: $499,990.00
Total Awarded Amount to Date: $449,189.00
Funds Obligated to Date: FY 2022 = $449,188.00
History of Investigator:
  • Fanxin Kong (Principal Investigator)
    fkong@nd.edu
Recipient Sponsored Research Office: University of Notre Dame
940 GRACE HALL
NOTRE DAME
IN  US  46556-5708
(574)631-7432
Sponsor Congressional District: 02
Primary Place of Performance: University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame
IN  US  46556-4635
Primary Place of Performance
Congressional District:
02
Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): FPU6XGFXMBE9
Parent UEI: FPU6XGFXMBE9
NSF Program(s): CPS-Cyber-Physical Systems
Primary Program Source: 01002223DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT
Program Reference Code(s):
Program Element Code(s): 791800
Award Agency Code: 4900
Fund Agency Code: 4900
Assistance Listing Number(s): 47.070

ABSTRACT

New vulnerabilities arise in Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) as new technologies are integrated to interact and control physical systems. In addition to software and network attacks, sensor attacks are a crucial security risk in CPS, where an attacker alters sensing information to negatively interfere with the physical system. Acting on malicious sensor information can cause serious consequences. While many research efforts have been devoted to protecting CPS from sensor attacks, several critical problems remain unresolved. First, existing attack detection works tend to minimize the detection delay and false alarms at the same time; this goal, however, is not always achievable due to the inherent trade-off between the two metrics. Second, there has been much work on attack detection, yet a key question remains concerning what to do after detecting an attack. Importantly, a CPS should detect an attack and recover from the attack before irreparable consequences occur. Third, the interrelation between detection and recovery has met with insufficient attention: Integrating detection and recovery techniques would result in more effective defenses against sensor attacks.

This project aims to address these key problems and develop novel detection and recovery techniques. The project aims to achieve timely and safe defense against sensor attacks by addressing real-time adaptive-attack detection and recovery in CPS. First, this project explores new attack detection techniques that can dynamically balance the trade-off between the detection delay and the false-alarm rate in a data-driven fashion. In this way, the detector will deliver attack detection with predictable delay and maintain the usability of the detection approach. Second, this project pursues new recovery techniques that bring the system back to a safe state before a recovery deadline while minimizing the degradation to the mission being executed by the system. Third, this project investigates efficient techniques that address the attack detection and recovery in a coordinated fashion to significantly improve response to attacks. Specific research tasks include the development of real-time adaptive sensor attack detection techniques, real-time attack recovery techniques, and attack detection and recovery coordination techniques. The developed techniques will be implemented and evaluated on multiple CPS simulators and an autonomous vehicle testbed.

This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.

PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH

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Zhang, Lin and Burbano, Luis and Chen, Xin and Cardenas, Alvaro A and Drager, Steven and Adderson, Matthew and Kong, Fanxin "Fast Attack Recovery for Stochastic Cyber-Physical Systems" IEEE Real-Time and Embedded Technology and Applications Symposium , 2024 Citation Details
Jiang, Shixiong and Liu, Mengyu and Kong, Fanxin "Vulnerability Analysis for Safe Reinforcement Learning in Cyber-Physical Systems" ACM/IEEE International Conference on Cyber-Physical Systems , 2024 Citation Details
Kong, Fanxin and Wang, Zifan "Attack Recovery for Cyber-Physical Systems" EAI International Conference on Security and Privacy in Cyber-Physical Systems and Smart Vehicles , 2023 Citation Details
Liu, Mengyu and Zhang, Lin and Phoha, Vir V. and Kong, Fanxin "Learn-to-Respond: Sequence-Predictive Recovery from Sensor Attacks in Cyber-Physical Systems" IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS) , 2023 https://doi.org/10.1109/RTSS59052.2023.00017 Citation Details
Lu, Pengyuan and Zhang, Lin and Liu, Mengyu and Sridhar, Kaustubh and Sokolsky, Oleg and Kong, Fanxin and Lee, Insup "Recovery from Adversarial Attacks in Cyber-physical Systems: Shallow, Deep and Exploratory Works" ACM Computing Surveys , 2024 https://doi.org/10.1145/3653974 Citation Details
Sulieman, M Hani and Liu, Mengyu and Gursoy, M Cenk and Kong, Fanxin "Path Planning for UAVs Under GPS Permanent Faults" ACM Transactions on Cyber-Physical Systems , 2024 https://doi.org/10.1145/3653074 Citation Details
Wang, Zifan and Zhang, Lin and Qiu, Qinru and Kong, Fanxin "Catch You if Pay Attention: Temporal Sensor Attack Diagnosis Using Attention Mechanisms for Cyber-Physical Systems" IEEE Real-Time Systems Symposium (RTSS) , 2023 https://doi.org/10.1109/RTSS59052.2023.00016 Citation Details

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