
NSF Org: |
CNS Division Of Computer and Network Systems |
Recipient: |
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Initial Amendment Date: | August 17, 2018 |
Latest Amendment Date: | August 31, 2023 |
Award Number: | 1814086 |
Award Instrument: | Standard Grant |
Program Manager: |
Joseph Lyles
CNS Division Of Computer and Network Systems CSE Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering |
Start Date: | October 1, 2018 |
End Date: | May 31, 2024 (Estimated) |
Total Intended Award Amount: | $163,500.00 |
Total Awarded Amount to Date: | $179,500.00 |
Funds Obligated to Date: |
FY 2022 = $16,000.00 |
History of Investigator: |
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Recipient Sponsored Research Office: |
4000 CENTRAL FLORIDA BLVD ORLANDO FL US 32816-8005 (407)823-0387 |
Sponsor Congressional District: |
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Primary Place of Performance: |
4000 CNTRL Florida BLVD Orlando FL US 32816-8005 |
Primary Place of
Performance Congressional District: |
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Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): |
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Parent UEI: |
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NSF Program(s): |
Special Projects - CNS, Networking Technology and Syst |
Primary Program Source: |
01001819DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT |
Program Reference Code(s): |
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Program Element Code(s): |
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Award Agency Code: | 4900 |
Fund Agency Code: | 4900 |
Assistance Listing Number(s): | 47.070 |
ABSTRACT
The Internet comprises tens of thousands of networks (Autonomous Systems) operated by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) that exchange traffic with each other at Internet Exchange Points (IXPs), to save on transit costs and bring content closer to their consumers. IXPs act as giant switches for groups of ISPs to exchange traffic and have a significant role in today's Internet as much of the traffic flows through IXPs. Stability and efficiency of ISP connectivity and peering relationships that form at these IXPs are crucial to long-term sustainability and scalability of the Internet. In the current practice, however, the price paid for traffic exchange at an IXP is typically determined by coarse, static measures that can result in end-to-end performance inefficiency in the traffic flows. This project aims to improve the state of traffic exchange and peering settlements at an IXP (for both non-profit and for-profit IXPs) through economically efficient pricing of IXP services coupled with flexible and value-driven ISP peering relationships.
Towards fostering stable and economically beneficial inter-ISP peering relationships, this project will investigate the following important questions. Firstly, it will explore how the IXP services for traffic exchange should be shared (in the non-profit model) or be priced (in the for-profit model) so that economic efficiency is attained at equilibrium. Secondly, it will investigate the potential benefits of paid peering at an IXP, when there is significant asymmetry between the traffic flows. Finally, it will explore how IXP providers (which typically operate at different co-location centers) can facilitate formation of groups between ISPs at different co-location centers to maximize overall efficiency of traffic flows across an entire geographical region. This project is expected to enhance the understanding on how IXPs should operate in the near future to cope with the increased rate and asymmetry in traffic exchanges, and streamline the peering process and make it value-driven. It aims to improve traffic flows in the Internet, and bring the content closer to users, resulting in higher traffic rates, lower costs, and lower delays in content delivery to end users. The project's impact and outreach will be strengthened through collaboration with industry, and integration of education with research.
This award reflects NSF's statutory mission and has been deemed worthy of support through evaluation using the Foundation's intellectual merit and broader impacts review criteria.
PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH
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PROJECT OUTCOMES REPORT
Disclaimer
This Project Outcomes Report for the General Public is displayed verbatim as submitted by the Principal Investigator (PI) for this award. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this Report are those of the PI and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; NSF has not approved or endorsed its content.
Internet Service Providers (ISPs) often peer with each other at Internet eXchange Points (IXPs), using a shared switch fabric, to save on transit costs and bring content closer to their consumers. Stability and efficiency of ISP connectivity and peering relationships that form at these IXPs are crucial to long-term sustainability and scalability of the Internet. In current practice, however, the price paid for traffic exchange at an IXP is typically determined by coarse, static measures that can result in end-to-end performance inefficiency in the traffic flows. This project's overarching goal was to address this limitation by exploring economic models for IXPs and architectural innovations to make the ISP peering process faster and more automated.
The scientific merit of the project centered around (1) developing traffic exchange and peering settlement models at an IXP (for both non-profit and for-profit IXPs) through economically efficient pricing of IXP services coupled with flexible and value-driven ISP peering relationships, and (2) exploring ways to quantify the value of a peering relationship for ISPs to enable faster and unambiguous negotiation of ISP peering contracts. This project analyzed traffic rate and/or port capacity-based pricing solutions at an IXP and showed under what conditions the resulting traffic exchange solution at equilibrium is economically efficient. Since ISPs form peering relationships in self-interest, this project modeled the peering problem from a game-theoretic perspective and characterized the efficiency of the pricing solutions in terms of the best- and worst-case performance at equilibrium, compared with the most efficient traffic exchange solution achievable. To facilitate faster and clearer peering contract negotiation, the project also developed metrics based on which two ISPs can decide whether and where to peer with each other. These metrics focused on the satisfaction of the ISP pair and the longevity of the peering arrangement, with a particular attention to the stability and performance of these peering relationships. The project introduced meta-peering tools to help and automate the ISP peering process – starting with identifying a list of ISPs that are likely to peer, writing router rules to establish traffic exchange sessions with them, and extending the service to monitor all these sessions for notifying any major outages or peering agreement violations.
The innovations emerging from the project may significantly improve the health of the ISP market with an expanded role for IXPs. The Internet is crucial to modern societies, and a healthy, sustainable, open and free ISP market is key to the long-term success of the Internet as an infrastructure. Many critical communication systems that we use in our daily lives have migrated to the Internet. Public safety, traffic control/management, law enforcement, emergency management are examples of such critical systems that use the Internet on a regular basis for operation. The project's work on the Internet's economic health, ISP peering health, impacts these societal systems by improving the speed and stability of peering relationships among ISPs. Peering among ISPs make the Internet's end-to-end paths shorter. The education and outreach activities of the project included training graduate and undergraduate student researchers, outreach to the industry, and integration of the learnings from this project into the curriculum.
Last Modified: 09/06/2024
Modified by: Murat Yuksel
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