| NSF Org: |
CMMI Division of Civil, Mechanical, and Manufacturing Innovation |
| Recipient: |
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| Initial Amendment Date: | June 29, 2013 |
| Latest Amendment Date: | June 30, 2016 |
| Award Number: | 1333454 |
| Award Instrument: | Standard Grant |
| Program Manager: |
Georgia-Ann Klutke
gaklutke@nsf.gov (703)292-2443 CMMI Division of Civil, Mechanical, and Manufacturing Innovation ENG Directorate for Engineering |
| Start Date: | August 1, 2013 |
| End Date: | May 31, 2017 (Estimated) |
| Total Intended Award Amount: | $144,596.00 |
| Total Awarded Amount to Date: | $144,596.00 |
| Funds Obligated to Date: |
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| History of Investigator: |
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| Recipient Sponsored Research Office: |
3124 TAMU COLLEGE STATION TX US 77843-3124 (979)862-6777 |
| Sponsor Congressional District: |
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| Primary Place of Performance: |
Mechanical Engineering Division College Station TX US 77843-3123 |
| Primary Place of
Performance Congressional District: |
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| Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): |
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| Parent UEI: |
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| NSF Program(s): | SYS-Systems Science |
| Primary Program Source: |
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| Program Reference Code(s): |
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| Program Element Code(s): |
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| Award Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Fund Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Assistance Listing Number(s): | 47.041 |
ABSTRACT
The research objective of this collaborative award is to delineate the benefits and limitations of value-driven decision authority delegation in large systems engineering projects as compared to the more traditional approach of delegating authority through a requirements flow-down process. A new and practical value-driven decision delegation approach will be defined based on the mathematical foundations of probability theory, decision theory, and game theory. Using rigorous mathematical analysis, the investigation will characterize this new approach and compare it to a requirements-driven approach. New methods will be derived (1) by which subsystem engineers can communicate their beliefs about technical capabilities to systems engineers and (2) by which systems engineers can incentivize subsystem engineers to seek designs that maximize system-level expected utility. The investigation will start by examining the case of a single subsystem and will culminate with the analysis of decision delegation in the general case of concurrent subsystem design.
If successful, this research will have a significant impact on the development of large-scale complex engineered systems of interest to private industry, the government, and the public at large. An improved understanding of decision delegation will enable engineers to structure engineering projects in a more efficient and effective matter, resulting in better systems, at lower cost, and within less time. Furthermore, fundamental insights discovered in this research will provide direction to future computational and empirical studies. Finally, the discoveries made in this research will be incorporated into new systems engineering curricula, which will lead to a better-prepared next generation of systems engineers.
PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH
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PROJECT OUTCOMES REPORT
Disclaimer
This Project Outcomes Report for the General Public is displayed verbatim as submitted by the Principal Investigator (PI) for this award. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this Report are those of the PI and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; NSF has not approved or endorsed its content.
The overall goal of this research project was to discover and evaluate different mechanisms for delegating decision-making authority in the context of engineering systems design. Specifically, the project focused on theoretical foundations by creating a game-theoretic mathematical framework for comparing value-driven decision delegation with requirements-based schemes used in systems engineering practice. An automobile design effort in which drivetrain, interior, and other design teams are told to minimize weight is an example of a value driven design approach. An automobile design effort in which drivetrain is allocated 600 lbs. or less, interior is allocated 300 lbs. or less, and etc. is an example of a requirements based systems design scheme. How these two different delegation schemes impact total vehicle weight is important for systems design. The results of this research enabled for the first time a comparison of the two delegation strategies in the same mathematical framework. Computational studies explored decision delegation in single- and multi-agent scenarios, where an agent is one who is being delegated some amount of decision authority. Neither value-driven nor requirements-driven delegation strategies consistently delivered the better overall outcome. Agent-level behavioral factors such as risk attitude and cost of effort were found to have a major impact on the success of each delegation strategy.
Last Modified: 10/04/2017
Modified by: Daniel A Mcadams
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