| NSF Org: |
SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences |
| Recipient: |
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| Initial Amendment Date: | April 3, 2017 |
| Latest Amendment Date: | May 2, 2022 |
| Award Number: | 1658952 |
| Award Instrument: | Continuing Grant |
| Program Manager: |
Nancy Lutz
nlutz@nsf.gov (703)292-7280 SES Division of Social and Economic Sciences SBE Directorate for Social, Behavioral and Economic Sciences |
| Start Date: | July 1, 2017 |
| End Date: | June 30, 2023 (Estimated) |
| Total Intended Award Amount: | $316,300.00 |
| Total Awarded Amount to Date: | $316,300.00 |
| Funds Obligated to Date: |
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| History of Investigator: |
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| Recipient Sponsored Research Office: |
9500 GILMAN DR LA JOLLA CA US 92093-0021 (858)534-4896 |
| Sponsor Congressional District: |
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| Primary Place of Performance: |
9500 Gilman Dr. #0508 San Diego CA US 92093-0508 |
| Primary Place of
Performance Congressional District: |
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| Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): |
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| Parent UEI: |
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| NSF Program(s): | Economics |
| Primary Program Source: |
01001819DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT 01001920DB NSF RESEARCH & RELATED ACTIVIT |
| Program Reference Code(s): |
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| Program Element Code(s): |
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| Award Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Fund Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Assistance Listing Number(s): | 47.075 |
ABSTRACT
Abstract
Future commitments that are not followed through, referred to as time-inconsistent choices (TICs), are considered the result of temptation to indulge in immediately satisfying activities. These activities lead to inefficient decisions, such as low savings, and the way to overcome TICs is to design contracts that force people to "commit" to their plans. This proposal looks at a new breed of TICs that people often do not want to commit to avoiding. Unlike usual TICs, this research will study temptations that are social rather than private. A large component of acting fairly or generously is the result of social pressures to give or to appear generous. These social pressures are felt at the time of the decision to give, while the joy of giving is not felt until the actual gift is transacted. People may be tempted to promise to give because of the social pressure to appear generous but may not follow through when the time comes to give. This TIC need not be cured by commitment plans, but by giving people the flexibility to break with their plans. This research will study how one can tell which cause of TIC is at work, and how best to improve people's outcomes. Understanding this new breed of TICs will lead to better decisions, such as increased savings, investment in education, and policy formulation, thus improving the living standards of U.S. citizens and the competitiveness of the U.S. economy.
The literature on TICs assumes that plans for the future are made free from present bias which can only be overcome by commitment plans. The idea behind this research is that the same behavior?stating and breaking a plan?can come from two equally natural and intuitive models, but one is best cured by commitment while the other requires flexibility. Besides the usual TICs resulting from "present bias", some people make commitment for the future they do not intend to follow through because of social pressure. Efficient policy to deal with this type of time inconsistent choice is to allow for flexibility to opt out of the commitment. This research will develop models and conduct experiments to distinguish between the two sources of TICs. The ideas developed will be applied to several areas, such as charitable giving and notions of fairness and justice, where social pressures are important. The research will use a combination of laboratory and field experiments, and economic theory to develop hypotheses and tests. The results of this research will help us better understand the issues of time-inconsistent choices and help provide better contract design to improve social outcomes. The results are also applicable to several areas of economics and other social sciences.
PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH
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PROJECT OUTCOMES REPORT
Disclaimer
This Project Outcomes Report for the General Public is displayed verbatim as submitted by the Principal Investigator (PI) for this award. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this Report are those of the PI and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; NSF has not approved or endorsed its content.
There were many diverse products of this grant, but the main themes were to encourage the scientific community to think more broadly about what we mean by 'preferences' in economics, how we define them (any motive that may underlie a decision), and ask how we can demonstrate a richer and fuller picture of the human being that we are observing in real life, whether that person is measured in the wild or in a lab setting.
My papers have been published in international general science journals, like Nature and PNAS, and are widely cited in psychology, decision sciences, neuroscience.
We usually assume purchasers of commodities experience utility at the point of transacting a purchase, when money and ownership are exchanged. With charitable giving, the social rewards from giving can begin being enjoyed the moment a decision to give has been made. Later, when the gift is transacted, the donor can again experience utility from giving and seeing their donations at work. We show both theoretically and experimentally that these early flows of social utility can generate time inconsistent charitable giving. A fundraiser can get more donations (50 percent more in our Experiment 1) by allowing a donor to decide now to give later. We develop a theoretical model of social utility gained through social image concerns, and in two additional experiments examine its implications for commitment demand and test the model predictions for how charities can manipulate information to influence time inconsistent charitable giving.
https://econweb.ucsd.edu/~jandreon/Publications/JPPUBE20AndSerraGarciaTICCG.pdf
Last Modified: 07/12/2024
Modified by: James Andreoni
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