| NSF Org: |
CNS Division Of Computer and Network Systems |
| Recipient: |
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| Initial Amendment Date: | July 27, 2015 |
| Latest Amendment Date: | July 27, 2015 |
| Award Number: | 1526801 |
| Award Instrument: | Standard Grant |
| Program Manager: |
James Joshi
CNS Division Of Computer and Network Systems CSE Directorate for Computer and Information Science and Engineering |
| Start Date: | September 1, 2015 |
| End Date: | August 31, 2019 (Estimated) |
| Total Intended Award Amount: | $500,000.00 |
| Total Awarded Amount to Date: | $500,000.00 |
| Funds Obligated to Date: |
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| History of Investigator: |
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| Recipient Sponsored Research Office: |
9500 GILMAN DR LA JOLLA CA US 92093-0021 (858)534-4896 |
| Sponsor Congressional District: |
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| Primary Place of Performance: |
CA US 92093-0404 |
| Primary Place of
Performance Congressional District: |
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| Unique Entity Identifier (UEI): |
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| Parent UEI: |
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| NSF Program(s): | Secure &Trustworthy Cyberspace |
| Primary Program Source: |
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| Program Reference Code(s): |
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| Program Element Code(s): |
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| Award Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Fund Agency Code: | 4900 |
| Assistance Listing Number(s): | 47.070 |
ABSTRACT
This work aims to effectively address security concerns while maintaining the privacy of individuals and corporations. The project analyzes subversive attacks, develops defenses and deterrents, creates privacy tools and software, and increases awareness and expertise through teaching, mentoring and involvement of students in research.
This research rethinks the basics of cryptographic security to provide new models, frameworks, tools and solutions. This project considers the subversion of random number generators and offers forms of encryption that are robust in its presence. The project explores: (1) the subversion of certificate authorities and offer certificate-signing mechanisms that deter it, (2) the exfiltration of cryptographic keys by malware installed on systems and development of big-key cryptography as a deterrent, and (3) the subversion of key distribution protocols through infiltration of their endpoints and development of new protocols to resist it.
PUBLICATIONS PRODUCED AS A RESULT OF THIS RESEARCH
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PROJECT OUTCOMES REPORT
Disclaimer
This Project Outcomes Report for the General Public is displayed verbatim as submitted by the Principal Investigator (PI) for this award. Any opinions, findings, and conclusions or recommendations expressed in this Report are those of the PI and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Science Foundation; NSF has not approved or endorsed its content.
Nation state adversaries subvert cryptographic security by methods that include insertion of vulnerabilities into encryption software, insertion of backdoors into standardized random-number generators and coercion of Internet corporations to perform subversive tasks. This project studied SUBVERSION-RESISTANT CRYPTOGRAPHY, identifying possible attacks and counter-measure in this setting.
Cryptographic algorithms make crucial use of randomness, making random number generators a target for subversion. To protect against this, we develop encryption that provides the best possible security in the face of low-quality randomness.
We are seeing increasing use of non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) systems. These assume parameters provided by a trusted party. These parameters may be subverted. We develop NIZKs that resist this, retaining as much security as possible even under subverted parameters.
Public-key encryption systems in use assume trusted elliptic curves, which become another point of possible subversion. We develop public-key encryption systems that are more robust than standard ones in the face of compromise of the elliptic curves.
TLS/SSL sessions can be compromised by coercing a Certificate Authority (CA) into creating a rogue certificate in the name of a popular server. As a deterrent, we suggest that CA's sign certificates with DAPS (double-authentication-preventing signatures), which in such a situation will allow anyone to recover the CA's signing key. We design and implement practical DAPS schemes.
Subversion can involve penetrating a user system to install malware on a target computer that can then exfiltrate a key. We develop big-key cryptography, which protects against this by using 100 GByte keys in an efficient way. We design big-key authenticated-encryption schemes and big-key block ciphers.
We give attacks that show how encryption can be undetectably compromised by malware that subverts the user’s encryption code.
Last Modified: 12/24/2019
Modified by: Mihir Bellare
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