The collapse of the Soviet Union was an event of global significance–all the more so because the process did not trigger an interstate war. The continent-spanning superpower with a terrifying arsenal of nuclear weapons dissolved, and fifteen successor states emerged and soon projected all the signs of functioning states. The process, however, was not smooth; in many places, the disintegration of the Soviet Union was far from peaceful. In the Baltic and Black Sea/Caucasus regions, the territorial order created over decades by the Soviet Union had already fallen apart. While the territorial order was not solely created by the Communists, the official borders of the Soviet Union when it was dissolved in late 1991 were in many regions “artificial borders.” It would become more so as former Soviet Republics laid claim to the “territorial integrity” of the new sovereign state on the basis of the legal principle uti possidetis (as you possess). Our project examined the fragments of Soviet territorial arrange-ments that came apart, spaces designated as the homelands of “titular” groups that were recognized as autonomous entities within the Soviet Union and claimed exclusively by their official “parent” republics.ce, key questions emerged about the status and spaces of titular nations. We examine three of them (Nagorny-Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia), that tsought to secede from their parent states (Azerbaijan and Georgia), along a fourth,Transnistria, that declared independence from Moldova.  In the context of the Russian annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the ongoing conflict in the Donbas region of Ukraine, we also examined the depth and extent of support for separation from Ukraine of large territories of that country in the south east and in Crimea.  Large representative public opinion surveys conducted simultaneously in late December 2014 form the key data for the project.  Since the questions are similar across the surveys and because they repeated some of the questions that we asked in the de facto states in 2010-2011, we can compare attitudes and beliefs accurately in multiple settings.

Despite nearly a quarter century of existence, the four post-Soviet de facto states still sit in a gray geopolitical zone, subject to the nature of great power relations. Without Russian guarantees, they would come under severe pressure through economic blockades and even military attacks. Russian backing now precludes any significant change in the status quo of the de facto republics and current interactions with their parent states. But any dramatic changes in Russia itself would have immediate repercussions on the small territories that depend on it. The local military forces are substantial and well-armed and undoubtedly motivated to defend their territory. It is Russian troops and bases, however, that will determine the outcome of any further conflict in three de factos (Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Transnistria), just as Russian geopolitical interests strongly influence the Armenian/Karabakhi-Azerbaijani peace process. The vast majority of the residents of de facto republics prefer this uncertain but relatively secure arrangement to any other alternative. 

The Russian government today sustains a diverse geopolitical archipelago of annexed territory (Crimea), recognized de facto states, unrecognized de facto states, and emergent de facto states in its near abroad. While Moscow keeps these diverse places afloat with federal largess, they are mostly troubled inheritances rather than full creations of the Putin regime. Residents of the de facto republics recognize their vulnerability to the decisions of external actors, especially the great powers, and their interest in international politics is high. However, the daily grind of making a decent living remains paramount, with unemployment and poverty ranking highest in their lists of problems facing the respective republics. While the security issue has been temporarily resolved by the Russian guarantees, high levels of migration and dependence on pensions and other Russian subsidies indicate chronic economic troubles. All have seen huge depopulations since the last Soviet census of 1989 due to ethnic displacements after the wars and migration motivated by unemployment. Support for the local regimes remains contingent on their legitimacy in the eyes of the citizens that is dependent on security guarantees and material well-being.25 Russian support is thus central to their existence and future stability. 

Last Modified: 12/03/2016
Modified by: John V O'loughlin